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Monday, October 26, 2009

sexual speech should be protected only if it has certain value, but never as much as political speech (post 4)

The question raised in communicative justice is whether or not words, images and sounds that stimulate erotic or sexual thoughts should be granted the same protection as political speech? I claim that this type of speech is “worthless” instead of worthwhile. Therefore, it should not be valued in the marketplace of ideas that is protected by the First Amendment. Adults should have the right to create such speech for private purposes but otherwise; it should not be distributed for public consumption and furthermore, it should not be protected the same way that political speech is protected. However, If the sexual speech proves to have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value, it should be protected the same way that political speech is.

According to the philosophers Alexander Meiklejohn and John Chafee, political speech should be protected since it promotes self government but there should be less protection given to speech that is considered to be worthless or private. Speech that is deemed sexual has no value in the test to finding truth. For this reason, I would also agree with the philosophical grounding from John Milton and John Stuart Mill. Since sexual speech is not necessary to finding truth in the marketplace of ideas, it should not be protected as heavily as speech that would be considered worthwhile in the same marketplace of ideas.

In addition to the philosophical grounding for my argument, I agree with the “offense” theory approach to pornography: that which offends should be banned. Since sexual speech does not physically harm anyone, I would not lean towards the harm theory in regards to my argument. Since many average people are offended by sexual speech, the offense theory will be applied. If the sexual speech is offensive, it is in turn obscene. The definition of obscene I would use in this argument is “anything that may be deemed by the average person to be sexually arousing.” If a TV commercial is trying to sell a product using speech or language that is meant to sexually arouse, it should be banned. If this commercial used sexual speech in a political or scientific context, it would be protected under Miller v. California which I discuss in further detail below.

While I argue that sexual speech should be banned from the public marketplace, adults have the right to create such speech for private use, distribute such speech for private consumption and receive such speech. If an adult wishes to “sext” another adult, sexual speech in that context should be allowed. He/She is not speaking sexually in a public setting; they have the right to choose whether that speech is worthwhile for them personally. In addition, they have the right to create sexual speech and distribute it in private. If an adult wishes to “sext” another adult a sexual picture of himself or herself, they have the right to do so in the privacy of their own home. They should also be allowed to receive such speech. As soon as sexual speech reaches a public level, it should not be protected the same way political speech is protected.

To support my argument on doctrinal grounds, I look to the previous case, Regina v Hicklin of 1868. The Hicklin test of 1868 tests obscenity in this way, “whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall.” This quote supports my idea that sexual speech should not be protected the same way as political speech in a public context. Such children and young adults are apart of the public marketplace they should be protected from immoral influences of sexual speech. If the sexual speech is in a private setting, it should be protected to the fullest, since between two adults, it does not threaten to leave an immoral influence.

Furthermore, I look towards Chaplinsky v. N.H., a case which refused to protect the lewd and obscene on the grounds that it is not worthwhile speech. Furthermore, I would like to look to Miller v. California that works on the same offense theory as I have. Miller v. California supports the idea that messages are banned UNLESS proven to have serious value (either scientific, political, or artistic).In order to overturn Roth vs U.S., I will use my philosophical groundings to argue that even though there may be some sexual speech cases that have “social value,” that form of speech should still not be protected the same way political speech is. It must have either a scientific, political, or artistic value in order for it to be protected.

There should be different levels of protection applied to different types of media. For example, books should receive more protection than broadcast or radio since the latter media have a “captive” audience that cannot always select what they see and hear. When a person buys a book, they know what type of book they are searching for and the books genre or message should be explicit to the reader before they even open the book. Moreover, web cams/chat rooms should receive a higher level of protection than cable. Since web cams are personal and chartrooms are divided by purpose or genre, cable is considered to have a more “captive” audience that would not be able to have as much freedom to choose the information they would receive.

The question raised in communicative justice is whether or not words, images and sounds that stimulate erotic or sexual thoughts should be granted the same protection as political speech? I claim that this type of speech is “worthless” instead of worthwhile. Therefore, it should not be valued in the marketplace of ideas that is protected by the First Amendment. Adults should have the right to create such speech for private purposes but otherwise; it should not be distributed for public consumption and furthermore, it should not be protected the same way that political speech is protected. However, If the sexual speech proves to have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value, it should be protected the same way that political speech is.

Wednesday, October 14, 2009

The Westboro Baptist Church: A Hateful Organization that Violates the very Foundation of our Nation (blogpost 3)

The question in communicative justice raised by the case of The Westboro Baptist Church vs. The United States of America is to what extent is The Westboro Baptist Church violating the First Amendment when they picket, speak publicly or privately in regards to homosexuals, American soldiers and the war in Iraq. I claim that The Westboro Baptist church is guilty of “intimidating and causing fear in a certain group of individuals based on their sexual orientation.”

It is the government’s responsibility to protect the inherit rights of it’s citizens. Because The Westboro Baptist church causes emotional violence and disturbance of the peace, they are guilty of violating the First Amendment. It is the government’s responsibility to convict them of causing violence in others. As John Stuart Mill and John Milton argue, the First Amendment allows for the sharing of ideas in a marketplace. The goal of the First Amendment is to allow American citizens the chance of finding truth through dialogue. They would make the distinction between worthwhile speech and worthless speech.

Using Milton and Mill as philosophical grounding for my argument, I would say that the speech of The Westboro Baptist Church would be considered worthless by Mill and Milton. Furthermore, the Westboro Baptist Church’s ideals have no part in the journey to truth, for anyone. In previous similar cases, Judges have established that having the “intent to intimidate represents a “true threat” and true threats, such as expression directed at a person or group of persons that places the victim in fear of bodily harm or death, are not protected by the First Amendment.” This quote, taken from Justice O’Connor who ruled in the 1992 case, R.A.V. v. St Paul, describes that actions like cross burning or funeral picketing are done so in order to cause fear.

The actions taken by The Westboro Baptist church are examples of hate crimes motivated by the sexual orientation of others. Because their actions are considered group hatred (or hate targeted to a certain group), they are violating the First Amendment, “the only way to identify group hatred as the motivation is by statements the perpetrator has made or by other symbolic behavior engaged in before, during or after the commission of the crime.” This quote, taken from Franklyn S. Haiman, a member of the Supreme Court Case against Todd Mitchell, a young back black who was convicted of aggravated battery, demonstrates that the motivation behind these acts is the real factor we should be looking at.

The signs, the verbiage and the actions of The Westboro Baptist Church are driven or motivated by hatred and that is not constitutional. The majority of our society believes that every American has the right to the pursuit of Happiness. We embrace diversity and the American Dream, whatever that may be for the individual. We voted an African American president into office and women have more rights and equality than ever before. Why can’t we grant those same rights for homosexuals living in America? They have the right to a peaceful assembly at a funeral and the U.S. government should be protecting those rights.

I would apply the highest level of scrutiny to this case. The fact that The Westboro Baptist is able to instill this great amount of fear in American citizens is wrong. It should be stopped immediately. If Americans do not have the ability to pursue happiness, whatever that may be for them, in the peaceful ways that they choose, then our inherit rights that Americans are born with, are being violated and taken away. Everyone has the right to a peaceful funeral. Everyone has the right to live a life of love and to choose whom that love be directed to. If we take away an American’s chance of peace, love and happiness, we would be taking away the very foundations our country was built on.

The question in communicative justice raised by the case of The Westboro Baptist Church vs. The United States of America is to what extent is The Westboro Baptist Church violating the First Amendment when they picket, speak public ally or privately in regards to homosexuals, American soldiers and the war in Iraq. I claim that The Westboro Baptist church is guilty of “intimidating and causing fear in a certain group of individuals based on their sexual orientation.”

Thursday, October 8, 2009

Al Timimi: Set Him Free-mi (blogpost 2)

When the nation faces war or a national emergency or some other threat to its national security, the imminent and immediate incitement standard should apply. Brandenburg vs. Ohio should not apply during times of war or during times that national security is threatened. Immediately after terrorist attacks or national security threats, “bad tendency” should apply. Schenck vs. U.S. demonstrates how “bad tendency” should be applied. At all other times, when the nation is considered to be “at peace” and not threatened, Brandenburg vs. Ohio should apply. If we were considered to be at war, Brandenburg vs. Ohio would not apply. All speech and action should be protected up until immediate incitement.

Given the standard that has been set by the above, and the fact that he spoke before wartime, Al Timimi should be protected by the first amendment. His conviction is considered unconstitutional. However, because he is guilty of “bad tendency” Timimi should be fined or imprisoned for committing the act of treason. A life sentence of imprisonment is considered to be cruel and unusual punishment in the case. Since Timimi stayed in the United States and did not travel with his friends to Pakistan, I would say he did not incite any action.

My philosophical reasoning behind these decisions follows that of Post who believes that self government should be promoted through political speech and that there are certain contexts that allow for certain speech. Because Timimi was teaching to a small group of Muslim friends, his religious beliefs that he chose to share with friends should be protected. Because we were not at war when Timimi spoke these words, my precedent comes from Brandenburg vs. Ohio. Timimi is guilty of “advocating ideas” not “advocating illegal action.” This case goes beyond “clear and present danger” and has more to do with the issue of incitement. If Timimi had taken up arms and killed U.S. Soldiers himself, he would be guilty of advocating and carrying out illegal actions.

In this specific case, Al Timimi has the burden of proving his innocence to a court that is scared and biased by terrorist attacks. Like we discussed in class: would Timimi be convicted if the attacks on September 11th had never happened? What if he said these things now instead of then? The fact that there isn’t consistency in these answers and decisions shows that Timimi deserves a second trail, a second review of the decisions we made for his life.

The government needed to have a strict scrutiny level to restrict this category of speech. If they are going to imprison this man for his life, there should be more than a rational or substantial reason to be involved. What Timimi did is no different from Brandenburg did in 1969. Both Brandenburg and Timimi have the right to express their ideas without encouraging or taking part in any illegal actions. The fact that Timimi was a Muslim man speaking just days after the September 11th attacks does not mean he is deserving of a harsher punishment than Brandenburg was forty years ago.

If the president of the United States had declared a war on Al Qaeda or on any Middle Eastern Country, then Timimi would be speaking out against the United States during a time of war, which is considered treason or bad tendency. What he would be doing then would be comparable to what Schenck did in 1919. Furthermore, I would apply the harm principle to Timimi’s case. His words did not physically harm anyone. His words did not lead to personal action. Timimi spoke to an audience much like Marc Antony did many years ago.

If I were a supreme court justice reviewing Timimi’s case, considering a first amendment appeal of his case, I would uphold Brandenburg vs. Ohio, ONLY if we were considered to be in war at the time. If we were not officially declared to be in a war, I would overturn the application of Brandenburg vs. Ohio for prosecuting incitements against the government. Depending on the wartime or not, I would overturn Timimi’s case, granting him a lesser punishment for his words. Again, I would apply the harm principle. Since Timimi never harmed anyone by his words, I would grant him the FOE to say the things he did. Since I most agree with Post, a philosopher from Chapter 15 from our text, Timimi’s speech would be protected. The context in which he spoke is acceptable and should considered to be private speech. Given the facts of this case, I would overturn the Supreme Court’s decision to keep Al Timimi in prison for life.

Sunday, October 4, 2009

494 Blog Post #1

Laws governing communication should primarily protect the individual and their universal civil liberty even if asserted against the group.

I would insist that film makers in Dubai have a right to their own set of rules, in their own country. If a film they produced were shown in the U.S., that film should be screened with our standards but that individual has the right to express their own beliefs even if those beliefs assert themselves against a larger group.

In the case of public schools, it should be required that all forms of creation stories are taught. When a child is fully educated on all sides to the creation story, that child will be able to make decisions for themselves. For example, I went to private High School and it my religion class, we learned the classic catholic creation story. In addition, in my Earth Science and Biology classes, we learned about Darwin, natural selection, and the many other aspects to the belief of evolution.

It was up to us students to decide what we wanted to believe. Many of us ending up blending what we had learned in both classes. If a student attends a private University however, that school has the option of choosing what it teaches, because it is privately funded. Public schools should be teaching all different forms of creation.