Ali Al Timimi (post 2 revision)

The question in communicative justice raised by the case of Al Timimi vs. the U.S. is to what extent, when the nation faces war or a national emergency or some other threat to its national security, should speech that goes against the U.S. be protected? I believe that the imminent and immediate incitement standard suggested by the 1969 case of Brandenburg vs. Ohio should apply during times of war or during times that national security is threatened. As philosopher John Chafee argues, any form of political speech that promotes self-government should be protected. Furthermore, according to philosophers like Emerson, Haiman and Baker, words that work towards promoting self-fulfillment, should be protected since “growth is necessary for an individual.”

The case of Ali Al Timimi who was recently convicted for urging listeners to travel to Pakistan and take up arms against the American soldiers he thought would soon be sent to Afghanistan. A grand jury accused Al-Timimi of saying things that incite danger for the American people. The government then convicted him for treason; defined as a crime that covers some of the more serious acts of disloyalty to one's sovereign or nation. Also, he could have been convicted of violating the old Smith Act of 1940, defined as “knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise, or teach the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing the Government of the United States or of any State by force or violence, or for anyone to organize any association which teaches, advises, or encourages such an overthrow, or for anyone to become a member of, or to affiliate with, any such association.”

Historically, speech like this has been protected until it “incites limitless lawless action.” Brandenburg v. Ohio 1969 was a United States Supreme Court case based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It held that government couldn’t punish inflammatory speech unless it is directed to inciting and likely to incite imminent lawless action. In particular, it overruled Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute, because that statute broadly prohibited the mere advocacy of violence.

Because Ali Al Timimi spoke these words very soon after the September 11^th attacks, the large majority of the American people felt that he was out of line and offensive. While some of what Timimi said could be seen as harmful, it was much more so offensive so the use of the offense principle would support my argument. While much of what Timimi said was harmful, I would argue that it did not completely incite danger. He spoke his views and spoke out against the U.S. but in a political manner. It could be said that he needed to speak this way for his own “necessary growth.” I would argue that if Ali Al Timimi were to return to trial today for the same crimes committed, he would not have the same punishment. I believe it what the majority cultural values that landed this man behind bars. In terms of structural deference, the legislative branch must yield to the sovereign powers of the executive branch in determining the motives behind threats against the U.S. during times of war. It would be up to the Supreme Court to decide how to handle what Timimi said, no judicial branch should have the power to convict someone of treason, especially during times of war.

Having proven my case, I claim that Ali Al Timimi engaged in a form of expression that helped him with personal growth. The words he used may have intended meant to incite harm but it never got that far. I truly believe that the cultural values of the time made the Supreme Court sensitive to words that were close to being a form of treason or a violation of the Smith Act. However, looking at the context of his background and the outcome of his leadership, he was not in violation of either.

The question in communicative justice raised by the case of Al Timimi vs. the U.S. is to what extent, when the nation faces war or a national emergency or some other threat to its national security, should speech that goes against the U.S. be protected? I believe that the imminent and immediate incitement standard suggested by the 1969 case of Brandenburg vs. Ohio should apply during times of war or during times that national security is threatened. That being said, Brandenburg vs. Ohio would support my idea that words that don’t aim to incite should be protected, even during times of war.